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SCIENCE
ARE WE LIVING IN A COMPUTER SIMULATION?
BASICALLY, IF YOU BELIEVE THE HUMAN RACE WILL SURVIVE A FEW THOUSAND YEARS INTO THE FUTURE, ARGUES NICK BOSTROM, THEN THERE IS A VERY HIGH MATHEMATICAL PROBABILITY WE'VE BEEN CREATED BY OUR DESCENDENTS BECAUSE THEY WILL MAKE THOUSANDS, MAYBE MILLIONS OF COPIES OF A SIM THAT LOOKS AT THEIR ANCESTORS AND THERE IS ONLY ONE PRIME REALITY
THE SIMS
http://www.gamespot.com/users/Rpger79/blog?user=Rpger79
The Simulation Hypothesis or Simulation Argument proposes that reality is in fact a simulation of which those affected by the simulants are generally unaware. The hypothesis does not have global (there exist reality that is not simulated) scope since, if true, the laws of physics in our known universe require that there is a reality that is not a simulation as there must be a place housing the machinery on which the simulation is being run. The hypothesis itself relies entirely on the development of analog of Cartesian Dieu Trompeur futuristic hypothetical simulated reality, currently regarded as a fictional technology. This technology has been a central plot device of many science-fiction films, most notably Star Trek, Dark City, The Thirteenth Floor, The Matrix and Total Recall, as well as stories such as I don't know, Timmy, being God is a big responsibility[1] and A Very Special Shutdown Notice[2]. The Simulation Hypothesis has become the subject of serious academic debate within the field of transhumanism, via the work of Nick Bostrom and others.[3]
On the surface, the Simulation Hypothesis is an example of a skeptical hypothesis, a proposal concerning the nature of reality put forward to question beliefs. As such, there is a long history to the underlying thesis that reality is an illusion. This thesis (which can be dated in Western thought back to Parmenides, Zeno of Elea and Plato and in Eastern thought to the Advaita Vedanta concept of Maya) arguably underpins the mind-body dualism of Descartes, and is closely related to phenomenalism, a stance briefly adopted by Bertrand Russell.
However, Nick Bostrom and other writers postulate that this is not the case, and there are empirical reasons why the 'Simulation Hypothesis' might be valid.[3][4] It is related to the Omphalos hypothesis in theology.
According to Bostrom, one part of this trilemma formulated in temporal logic must be true:
- No civilization will reach a technological level capable of producing simulated realities.
- No civilization reaching aforementioned technological status will produce a simulated reality, for any of a number of reasons, such as diversion of computational processing power for other tasks, ethical considerations of holding entities captive in simulated realities, etc.
- Almost all entities with our general set of experiences are living in a simulation (or "You are almost certainly in a simulation" elsewhere: almost certainly your mind "would be simulated rather than biological"[5]).
thus leading to the following theorem:
- "So if you think that (1) and (2) are both false,
you should accept (3)."[5]
Because this lemma is formulated in temporal
logic it should be analysed according to specific timeline:
Present and Past:
There is no proof of simulation that "seems completely
realistic for it [mind] to interact
with" so probability that someone is/was completely simulated is
0% (zero percent).
Future:
but, if you think that mankind will probably develop and routinely use a device
that produces a simulated reality that (to a simulated mind inhabiting it) would
"seem completely realistic
for it to interact with",[5]
then you should accept that there will be probability higher than 0 that you
yourself will be part of such a simulation.[5]
However:
 | the assumption of this theorem is very far from being
complete[5]
(arguments against simulation realism: Gravitational
singularity, any of scientifical
singularities, weak helpfulness of Weather
simulation, weak helpfulness of Earthquake
prediction, Butterfly
effect; arguments for: "simulating a nuclear explosion can
provide more telling and useful results than letting one off for real"[6],
advances in surveys on Artificial
intelligence, Virtual
reality, KAM
theory - for instance useful in argumentation/simulation that in short astronomical term Jupiter will not pull out Earth from Solar System/into Sun → Orbital resonance) |
| simulations are sometimes modified during their lifespan, but Physical constants (exact), Mathematical constants (exact), Exact trigonometric constants are stable (not to be confused with programming constants which are changeable) |
| simulations are temporal ("can be turned off", "restarted"), so the longer we (mankind and/or a person) live, the less likely it is that we are part of a simulation |
| simulation that is undetectable for scientists (for instance both astronomer and at the same time quantum physicist) would have to be very large and detailed, and hard to motivate with mankind ethic. |
| theory about simulation undetectable by scientists is not in accordance with the principle of Occam's razor. |
MORE: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Simulation_hypothesis
BY NICK BOSTROM
Department of Philosophy, Oxford University
Homepage: http://www.nickbostrom.com
[First version: May, 2001; Final version July 2002]
Published in Philosophical Quarterly (2003), Vol. 53, No. 211, pp. 243-255.
[This document is located at http://www.simulation-argument.com] [pdf-version]
ABSTRACT
This paper argues that at least one of the following propositions is true: (1) the human species is very likely to go extinct before reaching a “posthuman” stage; (2) any posthuman civilization is extremely unlikely to run a significant number of simulations of their evolutionary history (or variations thereof); (3) we are almost certainly living in a computer simulation. It follows that the belief that there is a significant chance that we will one day become posthumans who run ancestor-simulations is false, unless we are currently living in a simulation. A number of other consequences of this result are also discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many works of science fiction as well as some forecasts by serious technologists and futurologists predict that enormous amounts of computing power will be available in the future. Let us suppose for a moment that these predictions are correct. One thing that later generations might do with their super-powerful computers is run detailed simulations of their forebears or of people like their forebears. Because their computers would be so powerful, they could run a great many such simulations. Suppose that these simulated people are conscious (as they would be if the simulations were sufficiently fine-grained and if a certain quite widely accepted position in the philosophy of mind is correct). Then it could be the case that the vast majority of minds like ours do not belong to the original race but rather to people simulated by the advanced descendants of an original race. It is then possible to argue that, if this were the case, we would be rational to think that we are likely among the simulated minds rather than among the original biological ones. Therefore, if we don’t think that we are currently living in a computer simulation, we are not entitled to believe that we will have descendants who will run lots of such simulations of their forebears. That is the basic idea. The rest of this paper will spell it out more carefully.
MORE: http://www.simulation-argument.com
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